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Is Culture a Justiciable Issue?*
Jessica L. Darraby**
Vast cultural terrain describes the contemporary art world. Tech-
nological detritus, computer sputum, advertising jingos, battered
signage, sketchpad specifications, literary innuendo, and even con-
duct bring diverse products within the ambit of visual art.1 Neon-
washed hallways 2 recast from engineering schematics, window
niches3 converted from architectural plans, and trade dress appropri-
ated from corporate commerce 4 all grace the corridors of museums,
transformed to high art under the pen of the critic and the presenta-
tion of the curator.5
Disputes involving creators, collectors and exhibitors bring this
compendium of product into the legal forum. Is the jurisprudential
frontier broad enough to decipher effectively such art world dis-
putes? Should the legal frontier be recharted to do so?
If the proposition is accepted that the twentieth century has broad-
ened acceptance of what constitutes art beyond painting and sculp-
* Dedicated to my 1989 Law and the Visual Arts students whose inquiries
invited this investigation and whose encouragement permitted this exploration.
** Jessica L. Darraby is an Adjunct Professor at Pepperdine University School of
Law. Some of these comments were delivered at "Funding Controversies: Giving and
Receiving Art Dollars," the program she chaired on January 3, 1991 at the Hirshhorn
Museum and Sculpture Garden, Smithsonian Institution, on behalf of the art law sec-
tion of the Association of American Law Schools. The author expresses appreciation
to Professor Merle Loper at the University of Maine Law School.
1. Some examples include artists David Hockney, Barbara Kruger, John White,
Donald Judd and Karen Finley.
2. Dan Flavin. See generally Raynor, Sculptures That Announce Themselves
With a Blaze of Light, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1991, at 11, col. 1 (N.J. ed.) (discussion of
neon in art).
3. James Turrell. See also Feliciano, Taking the Plunge Into a Batch of "Heavy
Water," L.A. Times, June 6, 1991, at F4, col. 1; Carbery Diary: Slugging It Out in a Sky
Garden, The Independent, May 18, 1991, at 37.
4. Andy Warhol.
5. The exchange of commercial symbols, devices and functional objects with "cul-
ture" are analyzed in High & Low: Modern Art, Popular Culture, CATALOGUE AND Ex-
HIBITION, directed by Kirk Varnedoe and Adam Gopnik, originating at the Museum of
Modern Art, New York. See also Nagin, The Politics of Plunder, NEW ART EXAMINER,
Nov. 1986, at 22.
ture, then like anything else that there is too much of, the result is
crowding. Crowding has created a proverbial traffic jam on the cul-
tural roadways. Will those seeking to unclog cultural commerce sum-
mon the cultural cops? Who will take that patrol? Will walking the
cultural beat expedite the flow of ideas or contribute to cultural
gridlock? Court dockets and legislative fora are filled, respectively,
with art litigation and regulatory proposals suggesting that some be-
lieve safe passage, however limited, is a cultural expedient.6
The parties claiming rights-of-way are not necessarily those for
whom systematic resolution is necessary. Artists, dealers and muse-
ums historically have had a predilection to settle differences in the
"back room." The back room is a physical area usually not visible
from the gallery exhibition space where deals are brokered and sales
are closed. "Back room" is used here as a realm where informal al-
ternative dispute resolution principles are loosely applied without the
assistance of counsel. The give-and-take of "you stroke my back and
I'll stroke yours," effective in a limited arena of identifiable players,
breaks down in the submarkets of a highly elastic market.
Art patronage is no longer limited to an elite.7 During the 1980s,
the economically endowed - business executives and entertainment
moguls, corporations, law firms, savings and loans institutions,8 cli-
ents of interior designers, and the government itself9 - leapt into
the art market.
Although many immediately think of the highly publicized Na-
tional Endowment for the ArtslO as a major government patron, its
budget is but a sliver in the heap of taxpayer dollars used to purchase
art. Programs that place art in public places link"i federal, state and
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), amended, 1991
W.L. 33355 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Glueck, The Basquiat Touch Survives the Artist in Shows
and Courts, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1991, at C13, col. 5; 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.104-12.109 (1991)
(emergency import ban added in 1991 to protect pre-Columbian art from Peten region
of Guatemala pursuant to UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property); 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106(A), 113 (1991) (amended to include Visual Artist's Rights Acts). See also
Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991);
Republic of Lebanon v. Sotheby's, 167 A.D.2d 142, 561 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990); Danae Art Int'l, Inc. v. Stallone, 163 A.D.2d 81, 557 N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990); Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 280 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1991).
7. Some observers argue that elitism has been "democratized" by money. See A
Survey of The World Art Market, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1ff.
8. The savings and loan debacle modified the art collecting practices of thrifts,
savings and loans, and banks. In 1990, CenTrust of Miami was compelled by the Flor-
ida Comptroller to divest its art collection, reportedly purchased on the advice of con-
sultants from an auction house. Financial Times, April 7, 1990, at XX. See Michaelis,
As Banks Slim Down, So Do Their Budgets for Artwork, AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 24,
1991, at 6.
9. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-ff (1990).
11. See Glueck, Art in Public Places Stirs Widening Debate, N.Y. Times, May 23,
[Vol. 18: 463, 1991] Is Culture Justiciable
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
local agencies as major buyers that use subsidized tax dollars to fi-
nance their purchases. The Art in Embassies program,12 the Art in
Federal Buildings program, administered by the General Services
Administration, 13 the Department of Transportation 14 and its local
counterparts;15 various public art programs at the city, county, and
state levels; and quasi-public, legislatively-sanctioned development
agencies are but a few government sanctioned entities that partici-
pate in the art market.' 6
Although some of the traditional back room back-strokers - the
artists, dealers and patrones - have formalized their status as liti-
gants,17 those pressing for more art patrols appear to be new entrants
to the market.' 8 Players, qua litigants, who entered the market on
the power of the greenback, now claim that the dollar is an inade-
quate password and provides an insufficient initiation to a market
mired in mystique and swathed in secrecy.
Will the cultural market be better served by the warnings, disclo-
sures, offering statements, due diligence investigations, consents and
waivers that lawyers and legislators borrow in tone, substance and
vocabulary from regulatory schemes wholly unrelated to the elusive
and elastic qualities of art? If the codification of cultural commerce
is unsatisfactory, the common law web surrounding statutory
schemes is more synaptic than interstitial. Cases can be improbable
1982, § 2, at 1, col. 1; Russell, Gallery View 70's Art in Public Places - From Anchorage
to Atlanta, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1980, § 2, at 19, col. 1.
12. See, e.g., Wash. Times, Oct. 12, 1990, at E2; Gamarekian, Embassies Turning to
Cultural Concerns, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1991, at C9, col. 3.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at C21, col. 2.
14. See generally L.A. Times, June 30, 1991, at K3, col. 5.
15. See, e.g., Reinhold, Fantasy to Lure Subway Riders in Los Angeles, L.A. Times,
Aug. 4, 1991, at A20, col. 2. For its new subway system, the Los Angeles County Trans-
portation Commission, for example, "[d]espite pressures to cut costs in tough times....
[has] insisted on giving art a top priority. The transportation commission has allocated
one-half of one percent of the transportation budget for art, which amounts to more
than $100,000 for each of the five stations." Id.
16. It is not yet known how the current economic climate has affected budgeting
for these programs. The Community Redevelopment Agency for Los Angeles (CRA/
LA), authorized by postwar state enabling legislation, in effect assesses participating
developers a percentage of certain costs for its public art projects. This type of art fi-
nancing seems to survive downturns.
17. Art law cases now regularly appear on state and federal dockets in both civil
and criminal courts. Foreign sovereigns, shareholders, and celebrities have all joined
the art law fracas. Even as early as the fifteenth century, reports exist of artists de-
fending their oeuvre. See, e.g., Tine, Artists Outwit Inquisition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1990, at A19, col. 1.
18. Some entrants are not only new, but also unwitting. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ham-
mar, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 95,415 (Aug. 7, 1990).
and opinions can be too ethereal to provide a precedental legal ma-
trix. This is not to ascribe arbitrariness to the bench, but to illustrate
the dangers of opining about art in the jurisprudential forum. Art
authentication at the judicial level, for example, establishes legal fi-
nality to an inconclusive process of fragile dimension fraught with
the potential for market manipulation.19
That some art matters have come before the bench at all is a result
of lawyers performing not as barristers in the tribunal but as advisers
in their own offices. Deals have been negotiated that cannot on their
face be navigated in the cultural tributaries. Lawyers even "buckle
up" next to their clients or pack the deal vehicle with interests peril-
ously, but not necessarily patently, hostile.
Ethical considerations may not be evaluated properly if the market
is as befuddling to the lawyer as it is to the client. Lacking knowl-
edge of market mechanisms may impair the lawyer's contemplation
of those eventualities and "worst" case scenarios important in consid-
ering professional responsibilities and the client's best interests.
Should aestheticians defer at all to an authority legal in nature and
juridical in application?2 0 Should the practitioners of verbiage - the
lawyers - speak for the masters of imagery - the artists?21 Should
law be the arbiter of art, notwithstanding procedural attributes or
legal guarantees? Should art itself, whatever its manifestation, be
evaluated according to procedural tests, evidentiary rules and sub-
stantive law grounded in public policies and economic realities alien
to art production, exchange and presentation? Does the monetariza-
tion of the market during the 1980s account for its newly legalized
fervor in the 1990s?22
Are culturemakers following an itinerary they themselves never
contemplated, a legal road map regulating not only the flow of ideas
from creator to citizen, but also the context of presentation? Tax
laws, intellectual property laws, RICO,23 unfair competition statutes,
international conventions, nonprofit codes, constitutional precepts -
these are but a few of the roadways lawyers are paving to expedite
cultural transport.
But artistic expression has never been satisfactorily positioned in
19. Kimmelman, Absolutely Real? Absolutely Fake?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1991 § 2,
at 1, col. 4.
20. Extra-judicial resolution has been discussed by the courts in matters involving
"political offenses" as in extradition treaties. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
21. F. Galuszka, Legislating Ordern Dream or Nightmare, in CONFERENCE OF SOCI-
ETY OF ENVIRONMENTAL GRAPHIC DESIGNERS, Philadelphia Art Commission (April
1991) ("Art and Law are natural enemies").
22. See supra note 6.
23. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1991).
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law, even when tucked under the umbrella of the first amendment 24
or protected from its exclusionary spokes like libel25 or obscenity. 26
Never before in American history has the long arm of the law
stretched so far that its fingers tickle so much of the trafficking of
ideas, that ebb and flow of the cultural commute. Never before in
American history has the long arm of the law been linked to commu-
nication networks and information systems that so extend its reach.
Is there a pool of creators sufficiently confident, a strata of exhibi-
tors sufficiently courageous, 27 a free market system sufficiently effi-
cient, and a cultural citizenry sufficiently accommodating to
empower a mediation of cultural values outside the legal system?
Can the system forego controls, reverse position and return players
to the back rooms?
There are, of course, creators who recognize their own sense of en-
titlement afforded by the new litany of laws and who chart the map
to personal advantage.28 Ironically, Robert Mapplethorpe, from
whom self-assessment in this regard is no longer possible, may be a
singular beneficiary of arbiting the legal process.
Mapplethorpe, perhaps more than any other artist, has had his
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Serra v. GSA, 947 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). Cf
Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); People v.
Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).
But cf U.S. ex reL Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
25. See, e.g., Silberman v. Georges, 91 A.D.2d 520, 456 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 57 Ohio Misc. 2d 9, 566
N.E.2d 207 (1990); see also Piarowsky v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d
625 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. One Unbound Volume of 113 Prints, 128 F. Supp.
280 (C.D. Md. 1955).
27. A skittishness toward exhibition sensibilities is apparent in the post-CAC
world, or at least better publicized now in the media. Director Elizabeth Broun of The
National Museum of American Art (a Smithsonian Institution museum) ordered that a
three dimensional photographic work by artist Sol LeWitt, titled "Muybridge 1," be re-
moved from the exhibition "Eadweard Muybridge and Contemporary American Pho-
tography," which opened there on June 28, 1991 and is scheduled to travel to the Long
Beach Museum of Art next year. Parachini, Photo Show is Back in Focus, L.A. Times,
July 16, 1991, at F1, col. 5. Ms. Broun is reported to have objected to the LeWitt por-
trayal of the nude female image, which "'focusing increasingly on [the model's] pubic
region invokes unequivocal references to a degrading pornographic experience.'" Id.
This interpretation of the piece is disputed and the director's role in its removal, not
surprisingly, is controversial. Curators from the Addison Gallery of Art at Philips
Academy in Andover, the organizers of the Muybridge exhibition, threatened to termi-
nate the exhibition unless the LeWitt piece was returned, which it was. Id.
28. This is not to ascribe any judgment to those who do or do not utilize the legal
system.
work analyzed ih the marketplace of ideas. 29 Although the provoca-
tive imagery of his 'oeuvre was produced without regard for laws or
jurisprudence, he chose the works and set the conditions of display,
in conjunction with a curator, for the exhibition "The Perfect Mo-
ment." He thus had the opportunity to mediate his cultural message
even if he did not foresee'where legal arbiters might take it. As bela-
bored as the natioial route was for the exhibit,3o the jump was short
from the Cincinhati Contemporary Arts Center to the county court-
house where, before 4 jury of peers, the Contemporary Arts Center
(CAO) di'rectOr and, the CAC exhibitors of "The Perfect Moment"
were tried or-obSceftty.31
Visual ait does not have 'a monopoly on unpleasant or socially un-
acceptable imaery.. Nbr is contemporary America the only situs
where cultural values become public and politicized issues. Charles
Baudelaire wis convicted under French law for offending public mo-
rality by publication 6f his poetry collection Les Fleurs du Mal. The
court banned six boems - a ban not officially lifted until 1949.32
In June 1857, Les Fleurs du Mal went on sale in Paris. By July, a
critic for Le Figaro wrote:
Never, in the'space 6f so few pages, have I seen so many breasts bitten - nay,
even chewed! - never have I seen such a procession of devils, foetus, of de-
mons, cats and vermin. The whole volume is an asylum ... of all the putres-
cence of the hurran'heart.'... (N]othing can justify a man of more than thirty
uttei-ing such monstrous monstrosities in a printed book!3
3
Fleurs wag §eized iid donfiscated in July.34 By August, Baudelaire
was on trial for blasphemy and offending morality.
29. Extensive public 6ommentary appeared in the nation's media. See, e.g., Chi-
cago Tribune, Dec. 31, 1989, at 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1989, at 35, col. 1.
30. Shortly before the 'cheduled opening date, the Corcoran Museum of Art in
Washington D.C. cajicelled its commitment to provide a venue; instead, the Washing-
ton Project *for the Arts wai substituted.
31. Cincinziti v. qontemporary Arts Center, 57 Ohio Misc. 9, 566 N.E.2d 207
(1990). The misdemeAor charges were as follows: Count 1, possession of photographs
of minors, rmale. arid female, both in a "state of nudity" with "lewd exhibition or
graphic focus on genitals" in 'iolation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (An-
derson Supp. 1990) (possession of material that shows minors in a state of nudity); and
Count 2, "display[ing] ot'exhibit[ing]" various photographs depicting "forearm and
hand of one peison inseried into anus of another, . . . finger inserted into a penis .... a
cylindrical object inseried into an anus,. . . a man urinating into the mouth of another,
... and a man with a w.ip inserted into his anus" in violation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.32(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (promotion, display or exhibition of obscene
material). Experts apparentl , convinced the jury that the photos in question had seri-
ous artistic valde. S*e Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe
Obscenity Case, N.Y. times, Oct. 6, 1990, at P1, col. 1. See also Curator Photo Defends
Exhibit, N.Y. Tines, Oct. 4, 1990, at Pi9, col. 1.
32. E. STARKIE, bAUDELAIRE 324-25 (1988) [hereinafter STARKIE]. Until Les Fleurs
du Mal was pu6lished in book form in 1857, Baudelaire was primarily known as an art
critic. Id. at 288.
33. Id. at 313 (quotinj Le Figaro, July 5, 1857).
34. Id. at 417. "
468
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In the Palais de Justice in Paris on August 20, 1857, Monsieur
Pinard, the public prosecutor, curiously opened his argument by sug-
gesting that the state was doing Baudelaire a favor because his works
would rise in market value as a result of the notoriety surrounding
the trial.35 To obtain a conviction and protect the people from "of-
fen[ses] against public morality,"36 Pinard (like Prosecutor Prouty
who stepped into Pinard's shoes one century later in Cincinnati),37
decided that the work itself would be the best evidence against the
artist. He called no witnesses.38 Reading the poems to the court, he
reportedly classified them as "lascivious and obscene."39 Emphasiz-
ing that the poems threatened religious and moral decency, Pinard
summarized with the thought that: "The court must censure the ten-
dency to speak about and describe things at random because... out-
spokenness awakens in those who have no experience of life a
curiosity about matters of which they were better ignorant."40
The verdict? Baudelaire, ironically the author of the artist-as-hero
essay in "The Painter of Modern Life" apparently went too far for
Second Empire judgments with "sordid painting"41 in poems like
"Lesbos" and "Les Femmes Damnees." He was convicted of violating
public morality but acquitted of blasphemy. 42 The first edition of
Fleurs was destroyed.43
Curiously, Baudelaire's name does not appear in recent discussions
of another verbal painter, Salman Rushdie. Although Rushdie indu-
bitably would have preferred the court conviction of Baudelaire, he is
indefinitely sentenced to isolation imposed not by the rap of the gavel
35. Id. at 322. But see Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assoc., 745 F Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (contention that an art-related controversy would benefit plaintiff-art-
ist's career was refuted because of the artist's particular market position).
36. STARKIE, supra note 32, at 322.
37. Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 57 Ohio. Misc. 9, 566 N.E.2d 207
(1990). Baudelaire's attorney argued unsuccessfully that Les Fleurs du Mal should be
judged as a whole, instead of focusing on the six poems which the prosecution had ex-
cised. STARKIE, supra note 32, at 324. Defense counsel for CAC put forth the same
argument, contending that "The Perfect Moment" must be viewed in its entirety
under the Miller v. California test instead of on selected photographs from the exhibi-
tion. See 418 U.S. 915 (1974). The CAC court permitted the jury to review copies of
the selected photographs in isolation, but some contend that the decision was not in
accord with precedent. Margolick, Rank-and-File Rebuff Censorship, N.Y. Times, Oct.
6, 1990, at P6, col. 1.
38. STARKIE, supra note 32, at 322-24.
39. STARKIE, supra note 32, at 322.
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id. at 324.
42. Id.
43. Id.
but by the jeer of the crowd.44 This crowd is one clothed in a reli-
gious imperative so confining that manipulation of its precepts, even
in fiction, is enough to trigger a death sentence. Neither due process
nor a jury of peers imbue the fatwah with the trappings of
jurisprudence.
What Mapplethorpe would have said in his own defense had he
been charged and called is speculative. His voice, like Baudelaire's is
now stilled; his life, like Baudelaire's, is occluded by posterity's pruri-
ence; his message, like Baudelaire's, survives only in his art.
But Rushdie's voice is still here, albeit quieter, and his own defense
is one essentially used by Baudelaire. "Description of evil does not
entail approval of evil,"45 wrote Rushdie.
Baudelaire fled to Belgium for asylum. But for Rushdie such asy-
lum is not possible. Rushdie resides in the contemporary technologi-
cally-possible swatch of international suzerainty known as the
"global village.'4 6 Unnamed and unmapped, perhaps, this isolated in-
ternational crossroads is home to a citizenry of universal cultural im-
port. Does it too require a world court to mediate aesthetic values?
Or have its resident visionaries moved beyond the pale? Where is
culture better situated - in the courts - or at such crossroads?
44. Publication of his book, The Satanic Verses, culminated in a call for his death.
See Scott, People, TIME, July 1, 1991, at 63; D. PIPES, THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR 27 (1990); T.
BRENNAN, SALMAN RUSHDIE AND THE THIRD WORLD viii-xv (1990). See generally S.
RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989).
45. An Exclusive Talk With Salman Rushdie, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 46. But
some read Baudelaire's own words as "suggest[ing] that pure art is a form of Satanism"
and that creative energy ought to be regimented. E. WIND, ART AND ANARCHY 2, 93
n.1 (1985).
46. Locking the Doors in the Electronic Global Village, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1991
at P2, col. 1.
